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BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
rights of infants and'incompetents are severed by the foreclosure
sale; that a purchaser at a County sale acquires a title which is
protected by res judicata from irregularities; that jurisdictional
defects, generally, are not grounds for upsetting the purchasdrs'
title if the deed is recorded and the two year statutory period has
expired; but that the Soldiers' and Sailors' Civil Relief Act per-
mits a returned serviceman to redeem his foreclosed property"iff
he acts promptly.
Matthew X. Wagner, Sr.
Robert C. Schaus
MUNICIPAL TAXPAYERS AND STANDING TO SUE
Introduction *
It is in the area of public law that one encounters the popular
impatience with a judicial attitude which requires, not only a
defined controversy, but also a plaintiff legally interested in if3
outcome. It is proposed in this comment to examine one part of
the general problem of standing to sue, a part in which this popu-
lar impatience has perhaps made itself felt, and the courts have
relaxed their traditional standards.
The specific problem to be considered herein is, in an actioi
against a municipal corporation or its agents, -what standing to sue
has a plaintiff solely by virtue of the fact that he is a taxpayer?
This is the initial query in all taxpayers' suits, which have been
defined as follows:
Taxpayers' suits are actions by one or more taxpayers
acting not alone as individuals but as representatives of the
other taxpayers, to prevent acts which will injure the tax-
payers and 'which are ultra vires or unauthorized, i. e., suits
to vindicate the public and common right to have the public
funds and property. preserved from spoliation by public
officers and devoted only to public uses; and also suits on be-
half of the municipal corporation.1
It is evident that a taxpayer's bill is a class bill, filed in the com-
mon interest of all taxpayers of the municipality,2 so that plain-
tiff has no private interest entitling him to sue. If he possesses
such a concern, it is not a taxpayer's action. Accordingly, if a
1. 18 McQumI.A, MuNciPAL CoRPOn oNs (3rd ed. 1950), 3.
2. Schlanger v. West Berzack Borough, 261 Pa. 605, 104 At. 764 (1918).
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taxpayer's interest is found insufficient, no effort -will be made in
this paper to indicate in what additional capacities (whether as
parent, creditor, etc.) a plaintiff might have standing to sue. Nor
will there be any inquiry into the merits of the action, this essay
being primarily concerned with municipal taxpayers' standing
to sue.
Municipal Taxpayers' Actions
Even the 'United States Supreme Court, of all tribunals
habitually the most watchful for issues of standing to sue, has
recognized that in a proper case a municipal taxpayer may have
standing to complain of the conduct of the local government.3
Massachus tts -z iMellon '.4 while it struck down a taxpayer's suit
against the Federal Government, indicated that the interest of a
taxpayer of a municipality in the application of its moneys is
"direct and immediate." For that reason, a justiciable contro-
versy is found. Such is the effect, however, only when it is a good
faith pocketbook action, and a dollars-and-cents injury is com-
plained of, a question which the Supreme Court apparently will
determine for itself.5 So where a taxpayer complained of Bible
reading in the public schools, but failed to allege that this activity
augmented the cost of conducting the schools or that his taxes
might be increased, it was held that no justiciable controversy was
presented.6 Plaintiff sues as a taxpayer, and must show himself
affected as such, although his injury obviously will not be unlike
that suffered by a large portion of the general public.
The preceding suggests two important, distinct questions:
(1) Is it necessary for plaintiff to plead an injury personal
to himself, one not sustained by people generally? This is equiva-
lent to inquiring whether a taxpayer's action against a munici-
pality will lie at all.
(2) Must plaintiff prove any injury to taxpayers as a class?
It is this question which the federal courts answer in the affirma-
tive.
3. In Crampton v. Zabriskie, 101 U. S. 601 (1879), a unanimous court, per Field,
J., stated at 609: "Of the right of resident tax-payers to invoke the interposition of a
court of equity to prevent an illegal disposition of the moneys of the county or the
illegal creation of a debt which they in common with other property-holders of the
county may otherwise be compelled to pay, there is at this day no serious question.'
4. 262 U. S. 447 (1923).
5. Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U..S. 429 (1952) ; Frankfurter, J., dis-
senting in Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U. S. 485 (1952).
6. Doremus v. Board of Education, supra n. 5. Cf. Everson v. Board of Education,
330 U. S. 1 (1947), where there was a measurable disbursement of funds, occasioned
solely by the activities objected to, and. a justiciable controversy was found.
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These two questions should now be taken up in order. The
New York Court of Appeals once assumed an influential role in the
realm of municipal taxpayers' actions. The common law rule in
New York was (and is) well-settled, that a taxpayer lacks standing
to sue unless he suffers an injury different from that sustained by
other taxpayers. The rule seems to have been first stated in 1856,7
and was strongly reaffirmed in two opinions by Judge Denio.
Clearly, the early New York rule in effect precluded all tax-
payers' suits, for if plaintiff could sue only when specially injured
he could not sue on behalf of all other taxpayers, which is the gist
of such suits. Thus if the state, through its attorney general, did
not bring- proceedings against its erring municipal agent, the tax-
payer could only hope to find redress at the polls. He found the
courts closed.
These New York cases at one time were elsewhere respected,
and have been followed in a few, but decreasing number of jurisdic-
tions9 Various reasons for the rule against taxpayers' actions
have been assigned by these courts. The chief fear finds expressioi
in the old argumnent against "opening the door," flooding the
courts with endless litigation over uncertain rights." It is said
that the interests of men in good government are joint and not
several, so that no self-appointed private party, in whom the peo-
ple have not vested any such supervisory power, can champion
the public interests. instead, it is urged, for wrongs against
the public, whether actually committed or only apprehended, the
remedy (civil or criminal) is by a prosecution instituted by the
attorney-general, representing the state's abused confidence, or
by some local agency.'2 Some courts have relied on the usual
7. Davis v. Mayor of New York, 14 N. Y. 506 (1856), holding that a suit to re-
strain construction of a railway does not lie in favor of a resident taxpayer who does
not own real estate on the street where the railroad is proposed to be laid.
8. Doolittle v. Supervisors of Broome County, 18 N. Y. 155 (1858); Roosevelt v.
Draper, 23 N. Y. 318 (1861). In the latter case, it was stated that the same rule ap-plies to actions against all types of municipal corporations.
9. Jones v. City of Little Rock, 25 Ark. 301 (1868); Wood v. Bangs, 1 Dak. 179,46 N. W. 586 (1875) ; Douglas v. City of Wichita, 148 Kan. 619, 83 P. 2d 657 (1938) ;Anderson v. Village of Rochester, 263 Mich. 130, 248 N. W. 571 (1933); Carlson v.
Helena, 43 Mont. 1, 114 Pac. 110 (1910); Turner v. City of Rek4svile, 224 N. C. 42, 29
S. E. 2d 211 (1944).
10. Craft v. Jackson County, 5 Kan. 518 (1870) ; Bryant v. Logan, 56 W. Va. 141,49 S. E. 21 (1904), where it was said, "(I)t is of high import that the action of
constituted authority of government should not be hampered and delayed by assail-
ment by any and every individual from disappointment, whim or caprice. The door
would be open wide to multitudinous suits filling the courts with litigation." 56 W. Va. at
142, 49 S. E. at 22.
11. Miller v. Grandy, 13 Mich. 540 (1865).
12. Craft v. Jackson County, supra n. 10; Bryant ip. Logan, supra n. 10.
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rule governing actions to enjoin a public nuisance. 3 And there
have been vague judicial murmurings -about possible dangers of
"fraud and collusion. ',14
Because of its total denial of the taxpayers' action, the com-
mon law rule of New York, while of continued importance to
lawyers of that state, has elsewhere fallen into almost total judi-
cial disfavor. It is now generally held sufficient that plaintiff
taxpayer will be pecuniarily injured by the conduct complained
of, notwithstanding that all other taxpayers will be injured in pre-
cisely the same way.Y Thus, so far as his personal status is con-
cerned, it serves for plaintiff to prove that he is a taxpayer. The
minuteness of his interest probably will not be assigned as a rea-
son for denying the action,' although it has been said that plain-
tiff's taxes must not be so infinitesimal as to be subject to the
maxim de miniinis non curat leX.17 It seems that, if plaintiff has
not paid his taxes, or even has paid illegal taxes voluntarily, he
cannot initiate a taxpayer's action.'8 Although it appears that the
great majority of taxpayers' suits have been instituted by resi-
dents of the municipality, the better view is that place of residence
is immaterial: plaintiff's interest as a taxpayer is no less because
he resides elsewhere. 9 Fortunately for taxpayers' suits, it is also
held that the motive behind the litigation is irrelevant: plaintiff's
motive may be distinctly personal, and not the avoidance of tax
burdens, but the court will not inquire into that.20 So much for
the problem of personal status.
Although the courts have generally dispensed with a require-
ment that peculiar personal damage be shown, in lieu thereof they
have uniformly insisted that plaintiff prove some kind of injury to
13. Ibid. For the rule that one who would abate a public nuisance must plead
and prove snecial damage not common to people generally, see Callanan v. Gilnan, 107
N. Y. 360, 14 N. E. 264 (1887).
14. Miller v. Grandy, supra n. 11.
15. Barry v. Goad, 89 Cal. 215, 26 Pac. 785 (1891): Poor v. Town of Duncombe,
231 Iowa 907, 2 N.W. 2d 294 (1942); Meyer v. Town of Boonville, 162 Ind. 165, 70 N.E.
146 (1903) ; Afton v. Gill, 57 Okla. 36, 156 Pac. 658 (1916); Noble v. Davison, 177
Ind. 19, 96 N. E. 325 (1911) ; Hannon v. Lawton, 25 Okla. 372, 107 Pac. 646 (1909) :
Bancroft v. Building Commissioner of City of Boston, 257 Mass. 82, 153 N. E. 319
(1926) ; Lang v. City of Cavalier, 59 N. D. 75, 228 N. W. 819 (1930) ; Harris v. City
of Philadelphia, 299 Pa. 473, 149 At. 722 (1930).
16. Brockman v. City of Creston, 79 Iowa 587, 44 N. W. 822 (1890); Bacon v.
City of Detroit, 282 Mich. 150. 275 N. W. 800 (1937).
17. Fugate v. McManama. 50 Mo. App. 39 (1892).
18. 52 Am. Jun., Taxpayers' Actions § 3.
19. Brockman v. City of Creston, supra n. 16; Commonwealth use of Wiggins v.
Scott, 112 y. 252, 65 S. W. 596 (1901).
20. Brockman v. City of Creston, supra n. 16.
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taxpayers as a class. The character of this injury is difficult todescribe, but the requirement conceivably could be held satisfiedby proof of any of the following:
(1) That the municipal corporation has done, or proposesto do, an ultra vires or illegal act. This approach would allow amere legal, not financial, injury to be shown, and would reduce therequirement to a matter of words. The law is contrary, and it is
settled that mere illegality is not enough.21
(2) That the municipal corporation has done, or proposes todo, an ultra vires or illegal act which involves expenditure of pub-lic funds or property."
(3) That such act involves economic waste of such funds orproperty. If plaintiff offers proof of waste, of course that suffices,but need he go so far? For example, may he enjoin perform-
ance of an unauthorized municipal contract, 
-which requires for its
execution the expenditure of public funds, on a mere showing ofthe nature of the agreement and" of its illegality? Although it ishardly possible to reconcile all of the authorities, probably the ac-tion could be maintained on a showing that the conduct to which ex-
ception is taken is illegal and requires public funds.2 If the con-duct is economically feasible, plaintiff might still be injured in afinancial way. As a taxpayer, he has two interests. One is thatfuture tax rates not be increased. The other is that existingmunicipal funds and property not be misused. These interests
would appear to give a taxpayer standing in court to demand thattax funds be channelled into proper undertakings. Such funds
were presumably taken for lawful purposes, and if they arediverted therefrom, there is some danger that new revenue will beneeded to finance the legitimate goals of government. At anyrate, because proof of probable increase in taxation would be sodifficult and speculative, the courts have never demanded thatplaintiff prove more than that the unlawful act is of a type which
naturally tends in that direction.
It is wise, however, not to lay down any absolute rules. In-stead, the courts will follow a common sense approach, keeping
21. Kaiik v. Janssen, 158 Wis. 606, 149 N. W. 398 (1914); Shoemaker v. Cityof Des Moines, 124 Iowa 244, 105 N. W. 520 (1906); Kiernan v. City of Portland, 57Or. 454, 111 Pac. 379 (1910), writ of error dismissed, 223 U. S. 151 (1912); Altgelt v.City of San Antonio, 81 Tex. 436, 17 S. W. 75 (1890).
22. See, e. g., Winn v. Shaw, 87 Cal. 631, 25 Pac. 968 (1891), where the countyboard of supervisors contracted to purchase realty, without publishing a notice of in-tention, as required by statute. Held, taxpayer had standing to enjoin performance ofthe contract, without alleging that the value of the land was less than the price to bepaid: such price was a claim against the county, and it is immaterial whether the latterwould profit or lose by the transaction.
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constantly in mind the interests to be protected. Thus, where
plaintiffs as taxpayers challenged the illegal removal of a public
building, which unless removed would be destroyed, it was held that
they lacked standing to sue: they could not possibly be injured
by the expenditure of public money for the protection of public
property." It is also in supposed conformity with the underly-
ing interest of the plaintiff as a taxpayer that a majority of courts
deny him an injunction against the -wrongful expenditure of funds
not raised by taxation. 4 Such funds are usually regarded as in-
cluding moneys received from another governmental unit.25Similarly, a general taxpayer can't restrain the awarding of a
street improvement contract where the cost is to be met by special
assessments upon benefited property; he lacks standing unless
the government attempts to discharge the debt from general
funds. 6 Nor may he complain of misuse of revenues derived from
operation of a city-owned utility; a taxpayer's interest is said not
to extend so far.27
The cases allowing taxpayers' actions have a strong prac-
tical appeal, for they provide a remedy with which the master can
avoid being plundered at the hands of his servant. But they have
not gone without theoretical justification. The principal rationale,
advanced by Judge Dillon, is based on an analogy to a well known
equity doctrine governing private corporations, whereby each
stockholder has such an interest in the corporate property that
he may interfere to protect the same from the illegal or fraudulent
acts of its officers. There is a trust, with the directors and officers
considered as trustees, the owners as cestuis que trust. This same
trust theory has been employed to explain equity's protection of
municipal taxpayers.28 .
Thus the rule permitting suits by taxpayers is harmon-
ized with the principles governing equity's intervention in
23. Williams v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 128 Md. 140, 97 Ati. 140
(1916).
24. Anna., 131 A. L. R. 1230.
25. Ibid. But there is strong dissent as to this. See Shipley v. Smith, 45 N. If.
23, 107 P. 2d 1050 (1940), holding that a municipal corporation has no more right to
waste a gift of money than to waste tax funds and that a taxpayer may enjoin either
type of waste.
26. Merritt v. City of Duluth, 103 Minn. 236. 114 N. W. 758 (1908) ; Patterson v.
Barber Asphalt Paving Co., 96 Minn. 9, 104 N. W. 566 (1905).
27. Andrews v. City of South Haven, 187 Mich. 294, 153 N. W. 827 (1915). But
the action will lie if plaintiff uses electric current purchased from a city-operated plant.
Freeland v. City of Sturgis, 248 Mich. 190, 226 N. W. 897 (1929).
28. 4 DILoN, MU1cIPAL. CoR'oRATIONS (5th ed. 1911), 2766. The same argu-
ment is sustained in 2'HIGH, INJUNcTIONS (4th ed. 1905), 1235-36.
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cases of breach of trust. This theory of the action is supported
by numerous cases,2  and seems to have gained the respect of theNation's highest tribunal.30 Whether it adequately accounts for
the present law in New York we shall next inquire. The answer is
to be had by a look to the past: "Upon this point a page of his-
tory is worth a volume of logic."
New York GeneraZ Municipal Law §51
In New York at common law, the principle applicable to
public nuisances was adopted; private persons could champion
their own-interests, but could not assume to be champions of the
community. This worked no very great inconvenience in the early
history of the state, when cities were not so large nor corruption
so prevailing. But the defect of the common law rule was visibly
demonstrated by the activities of the worst plunderer in American
history. William Marcy Tweed (1823-1878) was the most corrupt
man of a most corrupt era. It is unnecessary to detail the story of
his frauds. Suffice it to say that according to the Dictionary of
American Biography, the amount which Tweed's "ring" filched
from the City of New York has been variously estimated at from
$30,000,000 to $200,000,000.
Although Tweed was ultimately convicted, his swindle proved
the ineffectiveness of the common law rule, for law enforcement
officers were themselves the guilty parties. The result was the
enactment of a statutory remedy for taxpayers.2 1 Indeed, such a
statute -vas recommended by Governor Hoffman, himself a Tweed
man, who is his annual message to the Legislature (1872), after
referring to the "recent exposure of great wrongs in the adminis-
tiation of the local government of the City of New York," 32 called
for the creation of some "well-defined, summary and effectual
remedy in the courts for taxpayers against abuses of trust by
29. Cornell College v. Iowa County, 32 Iowa 520 (1871).; Miller v. Town ofMilford, 224 Iowa 753, 276 N. V. 826 (1936). In Sherburne v. Portsnouth, 72 N. I-I.539, 58 AtI. 38 (1904), the learned court stated: "The duty of city councils in ad-
ministering the ordinary business affairs of the city does not differ from that of thedirectors of a private corporation in respect to its business. Such directors act astrustees for their stockholders when they are administering the affairs of the cor-poration. So city councils act in a trust capacity in administering the ordinary business
affairs of the city," 72 N. H. at 542, 58 Atl. at 40.
30. Massachusetts v. Mellon, supra n. 4 (dictum).
31. That the Tweed frauds caused the statutory remedy, see Schieffelin v. Craiq,183 App. Div. 515, 170 N. Y. Supp. 603 (1st Dep't 1918); Adamson v. Union Ry., 74Hun 3, 26 N. Y. Supp. 136 (2nd Dep't 1893) ; Ayers v. Lawrence, 59 N. Y. 192 (1874);
Talcott v. City of Buffalo, 125 N. Y. 280, 26 N. E. 263 (1891).
32. 6 MESSAGES FROM THE GovwRNoas (ed. Lincoln, 1909), 378.
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municipal officers . . . ,,33 In response, the Legislature passed a
bill declaring that local government officers should be "trustees"
of the property and funds of such government, and: that resident
taxpayers should be cestuis que trust in respect to such property,
with all the responsibilities and remedies of trustees and cestuis,
respectively. This bill was vetoed by the Governor, who stated
in a special message to the Senate that he feared it might operate
to divest every municipal corporation of the legal title to its
property, and vest such title in the public officers.34 The Legisla-
ture then passed, and the Governor approved, "An Act for the
protection of tax-payers against the frauds, embezzlements and
wrongful acts of public officers and agents.' ' 3  This act authorized
a taxpayer's action against persons acting on behalf of any county,
town, or municipal corporation, "to prevent waste or injury to
any property, funds or estate" thereof. Ten yers later, "An Act
for the protection of tax payers' '" was enacted, broadening the
scope of taxpayers' actions. This statute contained the words,
''to prevent any illegal official act on the part of any such officers,"
followed by the words of the 1872 enactment, "or to prevent waste
or injury to any property, funds or estate of such county, town,
village or municipal corporation . . ." Thus we have the 1872
statute, aimed at "waste or injury," and the act of 1881, covering
"tany illegal official act" in addition. Still later, a third bill be-
came law, 7 which was for our purposes identical with GE -RAI
Mmc'A1 L~w §51. The remainder of this paper is concerned
with §51, and its first sentence should be quoted verbatim:
All officers, agents, commissioners and other persons act-
ing, or who have acted for and on behalf of any county, town,
village or municipal corporation in this state, and each and
every one of them, may be prosecuted, and an action may be
maintained against them to prevent any illegal official act on
the part of any such officers, agents, commissioners c r other
persons, or- to prevent waste or injury to, or to restore and
make good, any property, funds or estate of such county, town,
village or municipal corporation by any -ierson or corporation
whose assessment, or by any number of -.ersons or corpora-
tions, jointly, the sum of whose assessments shall amount to
one thousand dollars, and who shall be liable to pay taxes
on such assessment in the county, town, village or municipal
33. Id. at 386.
34. Id. at 429-32.
35. L. 1872, c. 161.
36. L. 1881, c. 531.
37. L. 1892, c. 301.
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corporation to prevent the waste or injury of whose property
the action is brought, or who have been assessed or paid taxes
therein upon any assessment of the above-named amount with-
in one year previous to the commencement of any such action.
This statute is the basis of taxpayers' suits in New York today.
The old equity action has not been abolished, 8 but one who would
sue as a taxpayer only must find his right in §51.31 If he is able
to do so, peculiar personal injury is not essential to his standing
to sue.40
In our discussion of taxpayers' suits in other jurisdictions,
a requirement was noted that plaintiff show some kind of injury
to taxpayers as a class. So far as §51 actions are based on the
"waste or injury" clause, the same requirement obviously pre-
vails.41 But most of the litigation under §51 involves the meaning
of the words "illegal official act." Is it sufficient to authorize thegranting of relief that the act complained of is illegal and official,
or must injury result to .taxpayers? And if the latter, is not the
statute of 1881 thereby rendered superfluous? Doubtless it was
this consideration which induced the Court of Appeals initially to
adopt a literal interpretation of "illegal official act."142  Thisliteral construction, however, encountered and failed the acid test
in Rogers v. O'Brie,43 wherein plaintiff *'as trespassing upon cityland. Defendants, constituting a certain city board, were prepar-"
ing to bring an action of ejectment azainst plaintiff, who sought
an injunction against said action on the ground that defendants
had no legal right to commence it. The Court of Appeals held
that, on a mere showing of illegality, plaintiff lacked standing to
sue. A non-restrictive interuretation of "illegal official act"
would ignore the underlying theory of taxpayers' suits.
38. Eagle Nest Corp. v. Carroll, 179 Misc. 99, 37 N. Y. S. 2d 716 (Sup. Ct. 1942),reversed on other grounds, 265 App. Div. 385, 38 N. Y. S. 2d 599 (3rd Dep't 1942).
39. Schieffelin v. Craig, supra n. 31; Altschul v. Ludwig, 216 N. Y. 459, 111 N. E.
216 (1916).
40. Brill v. Miller, 140 App. Div. 602, 125 N. Y. Supp. 865 (1st Dep't 1910);Gerlach v. Brandreth, 34 App. Div. 197, 54 N. Y. Supp. 479 (2nd Dep't 1898); Rogers
v. Board of Supervisors, 77 App. Div. 501, 78 N. Y. Supp. 1081 (2nd Dep't 1902). It isimmaterial that in bringing suit plaintiff is moved by some private grievance. Gage v.City of New York, 110 App. Div. 403, 97 N. Y. Supp. 157 (1st Dep't 1905).
41. It may be noted in passing that "waste or injury" has been construed to em-brace only illegal or dishonest acts, and not to subject the official acts of boards andofficers, acting within the limits of their power, to taxpayers' claims that such action
was uneconomic, improvident, or unwise. Talcott v. City of Buffalo, supra n. 31.
42. Warrin v. Baldwin, 105 N. Y. 534, 537, 12 N. E. 49, 49-50 (1887).
43. 153 N. Y. 357, 47 N. E. 456 (1897).
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In addition to a showing that the act complained of is illegal,
therefore, proof that it involves damage to taxpapers is required.
As to the nature of this injury or damage there is no very precise
answer. It is difficult to reconcile all the decisions. Consider the
following four eases:
(1) A taxpayer sued to restrain the employment of a person
ineligible under the Civm SERvicE LAw. It was held to be no
defense that the compensation agreed to be paid was not extrava-
gant.44
(2) A taxpayer sued to restrain payment of a judgment
illegally confessed against a city. It was held unnecessary for
plaintiff to show that the city was not justly indebted in the amount
of the claim. Judge Haight stated:
The statute under which this action was brought author-
izes a faxpayer to bring an action to prevent waste, and also
to prevent an illegal official act. If the action was based upon
the provision of the statute "to prevent waste," then it would
be necessary to show that the city was not justly indebted in
the amount stated in the judgment, for if it was there could
be no waste. This action, however, was brought under the
other provision of the statute, to prevent an illegal official
act.4
5
(3) A taxpayer sued to restrain the expenditure of funds
for the conducting of an election under an allegedly uncon-
stitutional apportionment act, and to compel the election to be
conducted in accordance with a prior apportionment. It was sug-
gested by the Court of Appeals that there should have been an
allegation that the elections would cost a greater sum under the
new, than under the old apportionment.46
(4) The City of Buffalo illegally contracted to sell a large
quantity of water. In the absence of a finding that the price was
less than cost or that the sale impaired the city's ability adequately
to supply its inhabitants with water, it was held that there was no
"1waste or injury". Nor was the arrangement an "illegal official
act." Though illegal, it was innocuous, while the theory of a tax-
payer's suit is that the illegal action is in some way injurious to
44. Peck v. Belknap, 130 N. Y. 394, 29 N. E. 977 (1892); see also, Ziegler v.
Chapin, 126 N. Y. 342, 27 N. E. 471 (1891).
45. Bush v. O'Brien, 164 N. Y. 205, 215, 58 N. E. 106, 109 (1900). For a similar
case, and a reiteration of the point that there can be no "waste" if the city is justly
indebted in the amount of the judgment, see Bush v. Coler, 60 App. Div. 56, 69 N. Y. Supp.
770 (1st Dep't 1901), aj'd, 170 N. Y. 587, 63 N. E. 1115 (1902).
46. Matter of Reynolds, 202 N. Y. 430, 96 N. E. 87 (1911).
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municipal and public interests, and if permitted to continue will
result in increased burdens upon and disadvantages to the munici-
pality and its taxpayers.47
These cases sufficiently illustrate the factual problems which
arise on this question. To them should be added the significant
case of Altschul v. itudwig,8 which raised the issue whether a tax-payer may restrain the superintendent of buildings from approv-
ing plans for the erection of a non-fireproof theatre in New York
City, on the ground that the plans do not comply with the BUMDMG
LAw. Sustaining the action, the Court of Appeals stated:
The mere illegality of the official act in and of itself does
not justify injunctive relief at the request of the taxpayer. To
be entitled to this relief, when waste or injury is not involved,
it must appear that in addition to being an illegal official act
the threatened act is such as to imperil the public interests
or calculated to work public injury or produce some publicmischief.49
And it was concluded that a crowded theatre, built in violation of
those provisions of the building code which are designed to secure
the public safety against fire, imperils the public interests and is
calculated to produce public injury.
The Court of Appeals, in the past two decades, has added little
by way of clarification of what constitutes "public injury or mis-
chief." However, a few general considerations may be stated, and
a few conclusions ventured. At one extreme, it is certain that a
mere showing of an "illegal official act" will not do. At the other,
it is clear that the illegal act need not involve waste or injury to
municipal property. This leaves a penumbral zone in the middle.
In deciding problem cases the courts will probably be influenced by
a variety of factors. One is the statutory history of taxpayers'
suits in New York, which has been one of steady extension. An-
other is the necessity of continuing to construe the act of 1881
so that, in view of the act of 1872, it will not be meaningless. On
the other hand, the judiciary is aware that as a taxpayer plaintiff
may seek protection for only a limited interest; and since every-
thing, illegal or not, which a municipality does, requires the
expenditure of money, the courts will and should require evidence
47. Western New York Water Co. v. City of Buffalo, 242 N. Y. 202, 151 N. E.
207 (1926).
48. Supra n. 39.
49. 216 N. Y. at 467, 111 N. E. at 218. See also, Brill v. Miller, supra n. 40;but cf. Breen v. Valentine, 170 Misc. 590, 10 N. Y. S. 2d 821 (Sup. Ct. 1939), aff'd 256App. Div. 1066, 12 N. Y. S. 2d 240 (1st Dep't 1939).
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that the objectionable expenditures are closely associated with the
illegality complained of, and cannot be disposed of by the maxim
de minimis. The judiciary is also cognizant of the fact that it is
unwise to decide questions in the abstract, or to harass local
government and its agents with a multiplicity of actions in which
the public is not genuinely concerned. But in view of the broad
holding of Altschul v. Ludwig, it seems doubtful whether any tax-
payer will ever be denied standing to complain of conduct which
may injure or affect him and his fellows, though it does not
necessarily affect municipal tax rates.
Conclusion
While Judge Dillon has attempted a theoretical justification
of municipal taxpayers' suits, it seems well to affirm, as did the
South Carolina court,"° that the rule governing public nuisances
simply does not apply in such cases. Certainly in New York,
taxpayers' suits are an attempt to supply a remedy, better
supported by practical considerations than on principle.
Hilary P. Bradford
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COURTS-QUOTIENT VERDICT RULES HELD
INAPPLICABLE TO TRIAL JUDGE
A widow petitioned to have decedent's real estate set apart
for her, exempt from administration. Creditors objected to a
report which valued the realty at $1500. By statute in Alabama,
homesteads are exempt from execution only to the value of $2,000.
In an action to determine the value of said property, witnesses
testified before a probate judge, who upon completion of the trial
orally stated: "Twenty-seven witnesses have testified in this case
to a total of $47,229, which gives an average figure of $1747, which
is less than $2000. The petition of the widow is therefore granted.
* * *" However, no such statement appeared in the transcript
of the judgment. On appeal the creditors sought to apply the
established principle that a "quotient verdict" of a jury will be
set aside on motion. Held: the ruling of the trial judge is affirmed.
His statements showing the basis on which his conclusion of fact
is founded are not part of the judgment, and on appeal the judg-
50. Gaston v. State Highway Department, 134 S. C. 402, 132 S. E. 680 (1926).
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